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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing
i

the State to try Mr. Amador on the charge bf possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, wpen he had already been

I
acquitted of aggravated robbery by a jury pn the same evidence?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Cake No. 860160
Cajtagory No. 2

RAULE AMADOR,
Defendant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appeal from a judgment and conviction against Raule Amador
for one count of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted
Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-10-503 (1953 as amended).

Mr. Amador was found guilty following

a bench trial in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
I
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homej: F. Wilkinson, Judge,
presiding.
STATEMENT OF FAfcTS
Appellant, Raule Amador, was originally charged with one
count of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) and
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony of
the second degree, in violation of Utah qode Ann. §76-10-503 (1953
as amended) (R. 11) (Addendum A ) .
Prior to trial, the trial Court ordered that the possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person charge be severed from
the aggravated robbery count pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9,
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (T. 2, p. 8) (Addendum B).

A jury trial on the aggravated robbery count proceeded on January
20, 1986.

Mr. Amador was acquitted of aggravated robbery on January

21, 1986 (R. 75) (Addendum C).

On February 11, 1985, Mr. Amador was

tried by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the charge of
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and
convicted (R. 85) (Addendum D).
At the jury trial on the robbery charge the following
evidence was presented, which was also relied on by the court in the
subsequent trial on the possession of a dangerous weapon charge.
On September 14, 1985, Mr. Amador accompanied his
girlfriend, LuAnn McSharry, to the apartment of Danny Worthen and
Wendy Bromfield, to collect a debt owed by Ms. Bromfield to Ms.
McSharry's Grandmother (T. 1, p. 161).1

This was done at the

request of Ms. McSharry's Grandmother (T. 1, p. 159). Both Worthen
and Ms. Bromfield admitted owing the debt (T. 1, p. 33,66).

When

Mr. Worthen arrived at the apartment with a friend, John Nicholsen
(T. 1, p. 9), Ms. McSharry asked for the money (T. 1, p. 162).
According to Ms. McSharry, Worthen was drunk, belligerent and
abusive (T. 1, p. 160-163).

Instead of responding to the request

for payment of the debt, Worthen began yelling at Ms. McSharry
concerning a dispute over a loan of Worthen's truck to Ms. McSharry
(T. 1, p. 11,66,160).

Ms. McSharry testified that Worthen used

"rough and foul" language and was extremely abusive (T. 1, p. 160).
An argument ensued (T. 1, p. 11-12,66).

^T.l refers to the transcript of the jury trial which
occurred on January 20 and 21, 1986, while T.2 refers to the
transcript of the bench trial held on February 11, 1986.
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The evidence differs as to what occurred next.

Worthen,

Bromfield and Nicholsen all testified that| during the argument, Mr,
Amador pulled out a gun, pointed it at Mr. Worthen and demanded the
money (T. 1, p. 12-14,67 113-120).

Ms. McfSharry, on the other hand,

testified that Mr. Amador intervened during the argument when Mr.
Worthen appeared to be reaching for a machete for the purpose of
attacking Ms. McSharry (T. 1, p. 165). Ms. McSharry further
testified that Mr. Amador did not have a gun and did not coerce
Worthen into paying the debt, directly contradicting the prosecution
witnesses (T. 1, p. 160).

Ms. McSharry also stated that Ms.

Bromfield then asked Worthen to give McSharry some money, at which
point Worthen took his wallet out of his pocket, opened it up, and
threw twenty dollars at McSharry (T. 1, pi 166).

L

Worthen testified that he gave the
t money to Amador because
Amador stuck a gun in his face and threat ened to " blow his head out"
(T. 1, p. 70). His testimony was corrobojirated by Ms. Bromfield and
Mr. Nicholsen (T. 1, p. 12-14, 113-120), but stood in contradiction
to that of Ms. McSharry (T. 1, p. 160).
Approximately a day and a half ^fter the incident, Mr.
Amador and Ms. McSharry were arrested based upon the complaint of
Mr. Worthen and Ms. Bromfield (T. 1, p. 132-135).

Upon a search of

the automobile Mr. Amador was driving at the time of his arrest, the
officers discovered a gun under the front passenger seat (T. 1, p.
140).

The automobile was owned by Ms. McSharry (T. 1, p. 107). Ms.

McSharry testified that she, not Mr. Amador, owned the gun and that
he had no knowledge of its presence under the seat in her car (T. 1,
p. 167-168).

The gun was identified by |Mr. Worthen as the gun he
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claimed Mr. Amador produced during the incident at issue (T. 1, p.
74).

Ms. McSharry explained that Ms. Bromfield and Ms. Worthen

could identify the gun because Worthen had repaired it for her prior
to the incident (T. 1, p. 155). After deliberation of the evidence,
the jury found the defendant, Mr. Amador, not guilty of aggravated
robbery.
Approximately two weeks after Mr. Amador's acquittal by the
jury on the aggravated robbery charge, a trial was held before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on Count II, possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person.

The Defendant moved the court for an

Order of Dismissal of Count II, on the ground that the State was
collaterally estopped from prosecuting the Defendant on Count II
where the jury found the Defendant not guilty of Aggravated Robbery
after considering the same evidence which would be presented by the
State in its allegations that Defendant was a restricted person in
possession of a dangerous weapon (T. 2, p. 3-7). Defendant argued
that this prosecution on Count II was barred as double jeopardy (T.
2, p. 3-7).
Defendant's motions were denied (T. 2, p. 13). The
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on Count II and the case
was submitted for consideration to the Bench (T. 3, p. 14-15).

By

stipulation, the record of the first trial was incorporated into the
record of the second trial and constituted the bulk of the evidence
presented by the state to support the allegations of the state that
Defendant was guilty of being a restricted person in possession of a
dangerous weapon (T. 2, p. 15). The testimony of Defendant's parole
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officer, John Shepherd, was also taken to establish that Defendant
was a restricted person (T. 2, p. 16-19).

The Defendant presented

evidence that a firearm located under the passenger seat of the
vehicle in which the Defendant was riding when arrested belonged to
Ms. McSharry, who was also the owner of the car, and was placed
there unbeknownst to the Defendant (T. 2, p. 22-27).

A receipt for

the purchase of the gun by Ms. McSharry wajs entered into evidence
(T. 2, p. 26).
Judge Wilkinson convicted Mr. Amajdor, finding, contrary to
Ms. McSharry1s testimony, that Mr. Amador did indeed possess a gun
in the apartment of Worthen and Bromfield,! at the time of the
alleged aggravated robbery.

From this conviction, this appeal is

taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Amador argues that the State(should have been
i

collaterally estopped from prosecuting hiib on the possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person charge because the jury
i

found him not guilty of aggravated robber]/ after considering the
same evidence that was presented by the Spate in prosecuting the
not prove the elements of
weapon charge. Since the prosecution did
of a firearm" in this
aggravated robbery, one of which was "use
case, it should not be allowed to prosecute on the weapon charge,
using the same evidence which the prior t|rier of fact found
insufficient.
jeopardy.

Such a prosecution should be barred as double

Appellant Amador contends that} because the second trial

violated his right against double jeopardy, the trial court
committed reversible error in not granting his motion to dismiss.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
APPELLANT AMADOR'S MOTION TO PROHIBIT
THE TRIAL ON THE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON
CHARGE AFTER HE WAS AQUITTED OF THE
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE.
According to the United States Supreme Court, if an issue
of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment that issue cannot be litigated again between the same
parties in any future suit.

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

Conceding that this doctrine of "collateral estoppel" developed in
civil litigation, the Court nevertheless held that it was embodied
in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and thus is
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ashe, supra.

In the instant case, a motion to sever was granted allowing
separate trials for two charges filed against Mr. Amador (T. 2, p.
8).

Mr. Amador was tried by jury on the aggravated robbery charge

(T. 1, p. 5) and tried by the bench on a separate charge of
possession of a weapon by a restricted person (T. 2, p. 14). After
careful consideration of all the evidence presented, the jury found
that the State had not proven the elements of aggravated robbery
beyond a reasonable doubt and thus found Mr. Amador not guilty (T.
1, p. 250). The Judge nevertheless found Mr. Amador guilty of
possession of a weapon by a restricted person, even though he
considered only the evidence that was before the jury during the
aggravated robbery trial (T. 2, p. 45).
To establish the crime of robbery, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the Defendant constituted
an "unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the
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possession of another from his person, or ijmmediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.

Utah Code

Ann. §76-6-301(1).
To establish aggravated robbery, the crime with which the
Defendant was charged, the State must not only establish all of the
above-listed elements of robbery beyond a teasonable doubt, but must
additionally establish the use of a "firearm or facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife qr deadly weapon" or
i

"serious bodily injury of another" during the course of the
robbery.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302(1)(a) and (b).
Bodily injury was not an issue iiji the instant case.
I

The

only evidence supporting the aggravated robbery charge was the
testimony of witnesses who claimed that Mr. Amador used a gun during
the alleged robbery (T. 1, p. 12, 67, 112).

Indeed, these were the

same and only witnesses who claimed that the incident in question
was in fact a robbery (T. 1, p. 12-20, 66-72, 110-120).

The defense

witness testified that the defendant did not have a gun (T. 1, p.
i

160). Mr. Amador contends that his acquittal by the jury supports
the conclusion that the jury chose to believe his witness over the
i

State's witnesses.

This being the case, lit is reasonable to believe
|

that the jury did not find that the element of use of a weapon was
I
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, support for this
I
proposition can be found in this Courtfs| cases concerning
insufficiency of the evidence. When facpd with a challenge to the
j

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982)1.
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State v.

Logically, when a jury's

verdict is acquittal, any reviewing court should view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the defendant.

In this case, Appellant

Amador contends that the juryfs verdict requires that the testimony
of Worthen, Nicholsen and Bromfield be disregarded.
Given that Mr. Amador was acquitted by jury of the charge
of aggravated robbery, an element of which is "use of a firearm",
the defense moved for dismissal of the possession of a weapon
charge, prior to the second trial (T. 2, p. 4). The motion was
grounded upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Defense Counsel

argued that inasmuch as the jury found, on the same evidence before
the court, that the defendant was not guilty of aggravated robbery
the State should be estopped from trying the Defendant on the
possession of a weapon by a restricted person charge arising out of
the same incident.

The motion was denied (T. 2, p. 13).

Mr. Amador agrees that it is not known, nor can it be
known, exactly how the jury deliberated and upon what
reasoning he was acquitted.

precise

However, he contends that the jury's

acquittal, in light of the evidence presented, determined that the
element of use of a firearm was not proven.

Since the Judge had

exactly the same evidence before him as the jury on the issue of use
or possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person and since
the acquittal evidences that this issue was decided, the State
should have been estopped from trying the Defendant on the
possession of a dangerous weapon charge.
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The policy behind not allowing th^ State to try Mr. Amador
on the weapon charge has been clearly articulated by the United
States Supreme Court.

That Court stated that:

"[t]he underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglof-American
system of jurisprudence, is thafc the State
with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a con tinumg state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guiltV,
This
underlying notion has from the very
beginning been part of our constitutional
tradition. Like the right to t|rial by jury,
it is clearly "fundamental to tihe American
scheme of justice."
[395 US 796]
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), Quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).

This court has also recognized the

policy served by the constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against double jeopardy in holding that:
The Clause does not allow "the State
to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offejnse," since
"[t]he constitutional prohibit!ion against
•double jeopardy1 was designed! to protect
an individual from being subjejcted to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction
more than once for an alleged offense.
McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321 (Utah 198 3), quoting Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).

In this caseJ the State did precisely

what the concept of double jeopardy is meant to prohibit.

After an

acquittal by a jury, the State tried Mr. Amador on exactly the same
evidence until it was finally able to obtpain a conviction.
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Since trying the defendant on an issue already decided in a
previous trial is a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969),

Appellant Amador contends that the trial on the possession of a
dangerous weapon charge should not have been held and asks this
court to reverse his conviction.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court allowed the State to prosecute Mr.
Amador on a charge of possession of a weapon by a restricted person,
after he was acquitted by a jury of an aggravated robbery charge
arising out of the same incident and based upon the same evidence,
Appellant requests this court find that Mr. Amador's constitutional
right against double jeopardy has been violated, reverse his
conviction and remand the case with an order dismissing the charges.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this' ; / ^ d a y of November, 1986.

B*ROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, do hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
^+t
J
84114, this r -" day of November, 1986,

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED BY

THIS

NOVEMBER, 1986.
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ADDENDUM A

»,..*». i,«R.e county Attorney
By: ' HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy County Attorney
3839 South West Temple, Suite 1-A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone: (801) 264-2260

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: HRL
Assigned to: HRL

Plaintiff,
BAIL

SUMMONS (Both Def.'s)

v.
INFORMATION
X RAULE SHEL AMADOR aka
WILLIAM D. JARAMILLO DOB: 3-3-60
LUANN D. MCSHARRY
DOB: 5-14-60

SWV^IO v/o^Jys/'
Defendant(s)

0^^^^

Crimlnal N o

-85-CRM- u u s a b a

T?VS>

The undersigned,
JEFF ANDERSON,
of the Murray
Police
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT I:
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 4560 South 200 East,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 14, 1985,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that ^ the defendant^), RAULE SHEL
AMADOR and— LUANN-D—MCSHARRY, as parties to the offense, unlawfully
and intentionally took personal property in the possession of Danny
Worthen from the person or immediate presence of Danny Worthen,
against his will, by the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm;
COUNT II:
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second, at
4560 South 200 EAst, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
September 14, 1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section
503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RAULE SHEL AMADOR, a party to the offense, did have in his
possession a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a .32 caliber handgun, and
he is currently on parole from the Utah State Prison for a felony.
Continued to Page 2.

INFORMATION
STATE v. RAULE SHEL AMADOR and LUANN D. MCSHARRY
Page 2,

COUNT III:
HABITUAL CRIMINAL, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section
1001, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended!, in that the defendant,
RAULE SHEL AMADOR, committed the First Degree Felony in Count I
above, and was then ad there a person who had been at least twice
before convicted, sentenced and committed [for felony offenses, at
least one of which offense having been at| least a felony of the
second degree, and was committed to:
EXAMPLE:
1. Colorado State Penitentiary, on March i0, 1981, at Canyon City,
Colorado, for the crime of Forgery, a secpnd degree felony, for a
term of 1-15 years.
2. Utah State Prison, on January 22, 19^2, at Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, for the crime of Robbery, a second degree felony, for
a term of 1-15 years.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
This charge is based upon Murray City Polide Report #85-12381, which
states that the victim was in his own apartjment at the above address
with the two defendants and others:
After the victim said something to defendant McSharry, which
defendant Amador did not like, Amador held a .32 caliber handgun to
the victim's neck and McSharry took victim's wallet from the
victim's trouser pocket. McSharry then topk $20 from the wallet and
the two defendants left together.
Amador is on parole from Utah State Prisori, and has been since July
9, 1985. He has been convicted of second pegree forgery in Colorado
and second degree robbery in Utah. He has been incarcerated at
state penitentiaries in both Utah and Colorado.

Continued on Page 3

ADDENDUM B

Attorney for Defendant
SaTtTLake" Legal Defender^Assoc.
333 4South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

Dtptf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SEVER

Plaintiff

vs.
RAULE AMADOUR,

Case No. CR85-1464
Judge HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendant

The defendant RAULE AMADOUR, by and through his attorn
of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, hereby moves this court to sever, fo
purposes of trial, Counts I and II of the Information contained i:
Case No. CR85-1464. Defendant bases this motion upon the precede
set forth in the case of State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah
1985).
DATED this

day of January, 1986.

Z.fJtlejL

"fl&6$J2

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake Cour,
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth Sojuth, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

day of January, 1986.

LttaU&
C'
£ Zo

ADDENDUM C

ggggw
Dep»

In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff
vs.

VERDICT

RAULE SHEL AMADOR,

Case No.

CR-85-1464

Defendant
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find

&Li& e J!fe!&u«

Raule Shel Amador, Not Guilty.
•••••••••••••••••••••»••••••*•••••••••.•••••••••••.•••«•••••••••»•••••••••••••«*«••»•••••••••#••*••••••«•«««•««•••••••»••*••••«•••*•••••••••••#•••••••••••••••••••*••••»•«»••••<

Dated

^tosJ^dL. 19 J.!P
/
rOfttUAN

GOGC

ADDENDUM D

COUNSEL:

STATE OF UTAH

7<H4*S&Ujrf-trrUy&lS1 \

irvs

KOMIL,

(^ COUNSEL PRESENT)

frmaJtwD

/^d^^j'^d^U^'i'

d A. CHILDS
ALAN SMITH
GRQVER MEDOEY
CLERK

HOMER F. WILKINJ
HON
DATE:

BAILIFF

OsfavtJ (hit
OUMJ/AHUU^ 'tAMaf

<^suJ
^
JJUUV.
^omus'^L&u/^

jM^uJ^fiu^/.

\^ifJdc&HJjLtvfca,

^S1Lu/4dJ-

at «

"TITLE:

• m i riuTir •

(*> PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

(*> COUNSEL PRESENT)

"Awztl^^isrttAfr'
7%

STATE OF UTAH
"V?

TP^

G. A. CMILP3
ALAN SMSTS
GROVER MEDLEY"
CLERK

HOMER F. WILK(N
HON
DATE:

BAILIFF

^^V^W^
• y i f i" 1
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